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INTRODUCTION
The Internet revolutionized the world like nothing before. It allowed for
various forms of communication and connectivity, yet produced a number
of social, legal, and economic challenges. Evidently, scholars began to
theorize that the Internet would lead to the development of new forms of
digital currency.' And, they were right.
This Note focuses on the regulatory status of a digital "currency" called
Bitcoin. 2 Specifically, it explores whether Bitcoin may be regulated as a
"security" under various domestic securities laws. Part II summarizes the
unique characteristics of Bitcoin and its current regulatory classification.
Part III analyzes the securities laws of the United States, the United
Kingdom ("U.K."), Brazil, and Japan- four regional leaders in financial
regulation. Part III also applies these laws to Bitcoin, arguing that Bitcoin
does not fit squarely within the securities definitions of any country.
Lastly, Part IV suggests a possible solution to regulating Bitcoin in the
United States under a "quasi-security" framework. It recommends that the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") define Bitcoin as a "quasi-
security" and pass regulations aimed solely at Bitcoin regulation, rather
than trying to incorporate it into existing legislation. By promulgating new
rules, the SEC can effectively spearhead the effort towards global Bitcoin
regulation.
I. BITCOIN'S UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS AND CURRENT
REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION
This Section explains what Bitcoin is and how it works. It discusses the
unique characteristics of Bitcoin, and gives a brief overview of its varying
legal status around the world.
A. Entering the Bitcoin Market
Bitcoin is the first digital currency that allows two parties to directly
exchange single monetary units without going through a central payment
I. See, e.g., Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic
Commerce: The Case for Private Currencies on the Internet, 11 HARV J.L. & TECH
733, 734 (1998) (noting that in the late 1990s, President Clinton stressed the
importance of digital currencies and identified electronic payment systems as a key
component of "a vigorous electronic marketplace").
2. See generally Matt Clinch, Bitcoin Recognized by Germany as 'Private
Money', CNBC (Aug. 19, 2013 10:25 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100971898
(stating that some countries also refer to Bitcoin as a form of "private money").
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system. The Bitcoin system is regulated entirely by computer software.
It awards bitcoins to users through a "mining" program that solves various
mathematical proofs and takes increasing amounts of computational
power.5 Once users take time to download this program and use their
computers to generate solutions, new bitcoins are issued.6 However, as the
number of users in the system increases, the mathematical proofs become
more difficult, which eventually slows down the production of bitcoins
over time.7 Today, due to Bitcoin's popularity, few users acquire bitcoins
through the mining process; rather, they acquire bitcoins in exchange for
goods and services,8 or they purchase them directly through online
exchanges.9
B. Bitcoin Transfers
Once a user enters the Bitcoin market, he or she may choose to engage in
Bitcoin transfers. Transfers occur through a network operated by
thousands of computers, similar to a music-sharing system like iTunes or
Spotify.'o Bitcoins are sent from one computer to another through
3. See Derek A. Dion, I'll Gladly Trade You Two Bits On Tuesday For A Byte
Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud In The Economy Of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 165, 168-69 (2013) (describing different ways that one can begin
trading in Bitcoin and various forums that are used for this trading).
4. See generally BITCOIN PROJECT, http://bitcoin.org/ (last visited Jun. 19, 2014)
(outlining the basics of the Bitcoin system for new users).
5. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4
HASTINGS Sci. & TECH. L.J. 159, 162-63 (2012).
6. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital
Currency, And The Case Against Its Regulation, 25 Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 111, 119-
20 (2012) (describing the entire mining process and the system of awarding miners
with bitcoins).
7. See Grinberg, supra note 5, at 163 ("As the number of miners in the network
changes, the problem difficulty adjusts to ensure that bitcoins are created at a
predetermined rate and not faster or slower. Currently, about 50 bitcoins are issued
every ten minutes, although the rate will halve to 25 bitcoins in about two years and
will halve every four years after that. At those rates, 10.5 million bitcoins will be
created in the first four years, half that amount in the next four years, and so on,
approaching but never reaching a total supply of 21 million bitcoins."); see also Steve
Forbes, Bitcoin: Whatever It Is, It's Not Money!, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2013 10:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2013/04/16/bitcoin-whatever-it-is-its-not-
money/ (explaining that, unlike typical currencies, bitcoins have no intrinsic value and
their real value is based entirely on supply and demand).
8. See Dion, supra note 3, at 169 (explaining that both legitimate and illegitimate
organizations accept bitcoins in addition to traditional currencies).
9. Dion, supra note 3, at 168; see PLANET BITCOIN, http://planetbtc.com/
complete-list-of-bitcoin-exchanges/ (last visited Jun. 19, 2014) (listing all of the
Bitcoin exchanges).
10. See Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin
within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 384 (2013) (analogizing bitcoins
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individual messages." Each message has a personal identifier called an
"address,"l2 and each address has an associated pair of public and private
keys, consisting of a string of numbers and letters.13 When an individual
transfers bitcoins to a recipient, the recipient sends his or her address to the
transferor.14  The transferor then adds the address and the amount of
bitcoins to the transfer message.' 5 Finally, the transferor signs the message
with his or her private key, and announces the public key to the recipient
for signature verification.' 6
In addition, the Bitcoin system provides a built-in mechanism to prevent
individuals from copying and pasting the same digital addresses over and
over again-a process that is often referred to as "double spending."" The
traditional answer to the double-spending problem was a central
clearinghouse, such as a bank, to keep a database of all transfers made in an
account. However, Bitcoin found a way to alter this approach.' 8 After a
transfer is completed, the system automatically broadcasts the time of the
transfer and adds it to the Bitcoin "block chain." 9 The "block chain" is a
computer-generated, public record of all Bitcoin transactions, back to the
very first transaction.20 Every computer on the Bitcoin network has a copy
of the entire block chain.2 1 After an hour or two, each transfer is locked in
22time by the massive amount of user transfers added to the block chain.
The use of this time-stamping process ensures that the same bitcoin is not
used in more than one transfer.23 Therefore, each individual bitcoin has an
to music files).
I1. COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions






16. Id.; see Kaplanov, supra note 6, at 117 (describing the public key as an e-mail
address, and the private key as the password needed to authorize the email).
17. Kaplanov, supra note 6, at 116-17.
18. Cf Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
(unpublished white paper), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (claiming that the Bitcoin
system was able to circumvent the concept of a clearinghouse because bitcoins do not
require any backing or "trust").
19. See Kaplanov, supra note 6, at I1 -18.
20. See Plassaras, supra note 10, at 385-86 (giving an in-depth description of
time-stamping and block chain procedures).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering
and Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 529, 532-33 (2014) (explaining
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irreversible history of transfers, tracing its movement from one computer to
the next.24
C. Bitcoin's Legal Uncertainty
Due to these unique characteristics, Bitcoin's legal classification remains
uncertain. On the one hand, the United States has made significant efforts
to regulate Bitcoin as a currency, subject to federal anti-money laundering
regulations.2 5 On the other hand, the IRS recently announced that it would
consider Bitcoin a form of property, subjecting every Bitcoin transaction to
capital gains tax.2 6
Other countries have taken similar inconsistent approaches. Brazil has
refrained from labeling Bitcoin a currency, requiring Bitcoin holders to file
capital gains like any other security. The U.K. has stated that an official
legal classification is premature until regulators fully understand how
Bitcoin works;27 yet, it has also treated Bitcoin as a "taxable voucher."28
Finally, Japan has openly acknowledged that Bitcoin is neither a currency
nor a financial product, but that digital currencies may be subject to new
trade rules in the future.2 9
Despite these differing views, one commonality remains: no country has
engaged in an analysis regarding Bitcoin's classification under existing
securities laws.
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BITCOIN'S CLASSIFICATION AS A
that the block chain stops others from "double-spending" their bitcoins and that if
someone tried to do this, the system would recognize the deficiency and reject the
transaction).
24. See id.
25. Angelo Young, US Treasury Department: Virtual Currencies (Read: Bitcoins)
Need Real Rules To Curb Money Laundering, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (March
22, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/us-treasury-department-virtual-currencies-read-
bitcoins-need-real-rules-curb-money-laundering.
26. Richard Rubin & Carter Dougherty, Bitcoin is Property, Not Currency in Tax
System: IRS, BLOOMBERG (March 25, 2014 4:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-03-25/bitcoin-is-property-not-currency-in-tax-system-irs-says.html.
27. Emily Spaven, HMRC: UK Bitcoin Exchanges Don't Have to Register Under
Money Laundering Regulations, CoINDESK (Jul. 8, 2013 2:39 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/hmrc-uk-bitcoin-exchanges-dont-have-to-register-under-
money-laundering-regulations.
28. David Gilson, Bitcoin in the UK.- HMRC suggests bitcoins are 'taxable
vouchers', COINDESK (Nov. 14, 2013 4:30 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-uk-
hmrc-suggests-bitcoins-taxable-vouchers/.
29. Tokyo Leaves Bitcoin Outside Financial Product Regulatory Framework,
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SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE U.K., BRAZIL, AND JAPAN
The regulation of new, cross-border financial instruments, such as
Bitcoin, is impeded by a lack of regulatory harmonization. Although the
trend is shifting towards international harmonization of securities laws and
standards, the existence of inconsistent national rules is a challenge for
regulators around the world. Some jurisdictions, such as the United States
and Brazil, have developed broad, inclusive definitions for securities in
order to address new, unorthodox instruments, while other jurisdictions
have not. This Part summarizes the securities laws of the United States, the
U.K., Brazil, and Japan, and applies those laws to Bitcoin. These countries
are not only considered leaders of securities regulation in their respective
geo-political spheres, but also, have similar economic and financial
structures. 30  Taken together, they provide a representative sample of
securities regulation around the world.
A. Although the United States Adopts a Broad Approach to Securities
Regulation Compared to Other Countries, Bitcoin Does Not Fit Squarely
Within its Securities Laws.
Securities regulation in the United States is broad due to its flexible
definition of "securities." According to the Securities Act of 1933,31 a
security includes common financial instruments like stocks and bonds, as
well as "investment contracts." 32 The Supreme Court has defined the
broad, "investment contract" category through a four-part test-commonly
known as the Howey test.33 According to this test, an investment contract
30. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, UNITED KINGDOM: IOSCO OBJECTIVES
AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF
IMPLEMENTATION (2011), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/i 0986/15973/807280ESWOBrazOOBox379814BOOPublicO.pdfsequence=1
(finding that the U.K. is the leading equity marketplace in Europe) appear to be in
place"); see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BRAZIL: IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION
(2013), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/
15973/807280ESWOBraz00Box379814BOOPublicO.pdf~sequence=1 (concluding that
"the Brazilian equity market made impressive gains in market capitalization and
liquidity over the past decade" compared to other Latin American countries);
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, JAPAN: IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION (2012),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/crl2230.pdf (stating that the
legal and regulatory framework for the securities market in Japan exhibits a high level
of implementation of international standards for securities regulation).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); see also § 78c(a)(10) (containing substantially identical
language).
33. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946) (holding that an
investment in the cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of fruit from citrus trees is an
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is: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, which is (3)
expected to produce profits, due to (4) the efforts of others. 34
The four elements of the Howey test have been developed through case
law. First, the "common enterprise" element has been subject to two
differing jurisdictional approaches. Under a horizontal commonality
approach, courts have held that the "common enterprise" element is
satisfied if the transaction involves a joint participation of investors sharing
in the profits. 36  Therefore, this approach involves a "tying" of each
individual investor's fortune to the fortunes of other investors. 3 Under a
vertical commonality approach, a court need only find that the fortunes of
an investor are tied to the expertise of the promoter, not to the fortunes of
other investors.38
Second, the "expectation of profits" element is only satisfied in
situations where an investor is looking for a financial return, not a
commodity or service. 39 Thus, the "expectation of profits" must be the
principal motivation for the investment of money.40 As the Court
concluded in United. Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, "profits" refer
to "either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial
investment ... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors' funds . . . ."41 For this reason, an investor must be "'attracted
investment contract because it satisfies the four elements of an investment contract).
34. Id. at 298-99.
35. See John F. Wagner, "Common enterprise" element of Howey test to
determine existence of investment contract regulable as "security" within meaning of
Federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S. CA. § 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.), 90 A.L.R. FED. 825 (1988) (summarizing all of the
case law in relation to the horizontal commonality approach and the vertical
commonality approach).
36. E.g., Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the horizontal commonality approach requires that the fortunes of two
or more investors be joined in a pooling of interests).
37. Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994); see Salcer v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3rd Cir. 1982) (stating
that the investment must be "part of a pooled group of funds"); see also Milnarik v. M-
S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1972) (emphasizing that the success
or failure of contracts by other investors must have a "direct impact on the profitability
of the plaintiffs' contract").
38. E.g., SEC v. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F,2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that the critical inquiry in determining whether the common enterprise element
is satisfied is whether the fortuity of the investments made with a particular promoter
depend on the promoter's expertise).
39. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 856-57 (1975)
(concluding that rental reductions and tax deductions resulting in savings do not qualify
as an expectation of profits).
40. Id. at 852.
41. Id. (quoting SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)).
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solely by the prospects of a return' on his investment."42
Third, the "efforts of others" element of the Howey test has also been
subject to differing views. Various lower courts have concluded that
investor participation in the generation of profits does not automatically
foreclose the finding of an investment contract, even though the original
Howey test required that profits result solely from the efforts of others.43
Courts have concluded that investors may be able to make small
contributions to the generation of profits; yet, such contributions must be
passive, and the efforts of others must predominate.44 Therefore, one
important factor in the satisfaction of the "efforts of others" element is the
amount of control that investors retain under their investment agreements. 4 5
Finally, courts have applied the Howey test to a wide range of varying
contexts like pyramid schemes. 46  Using the Howey test, courts have
concluded that investments in pyramid schemes constitute securities
because they seek to attract monetary investments in a common enterpnse,
involving a promoter who organizes the entire scheme with the promise of
future returns arising from the efforts of the promoter in attracting new
investors. 4 7  Although it would seem that pyramid schemes defy the
horizontal commonality approach to the "common enterprise" element
because the continued success of the scheme depends mostly on investors
who end up luring more investors through favorable pronouncements
regarding the scheme's high returns, courts have applied the "common
enterprise" element quite loosely in such circumstances.48
Given the broad, "investment contract" category and its liberal
application, the remaining question is whether the SEC can regulate Bitcoin
under existing securities regulations. So far, it appears that the SEC may
regulate instruments based on the value of bitcoins under federal securities
laws. 4 9 But, can a bitcoin itself constitute a security? In other words, when
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that, in
addition to the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court has relaxed the "efforts requirement
by omitting the necessity of the word "solely").
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (explaining that the existence of an investment contract turns upon an analysis of
the nature and extent of an investor's participation and therefore, the efforts of others
should be undeniably significant ones which affect failure or success of the enterprise).
45. Albanese v. Fla. Nat.'1 Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408, 410 (11th Cir. 1987).
46. See ALAN R. PALMITER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: SECURITIES
REGULATION, 55-56 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2011) (explaining why and how the U.S.
definition of "securities" specifically applies to pyramid schemes).
47. See id. at 55.
48. See, e.g., SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding a security in
an online investment game that depended on the ability of players to lure new players).
49. See SEC v. Shavers & Bitcoin Trust, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 *2
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you buy a bitcoin, are you buying an investment in the hope of acquiring a
future return?
Although the "investment of money" prong under the Howey test is
easily satisfied because users buy bitcoins on exchanges using traditional
forms of money,50 the other three elements require further analysis. First,
one could argue that the "common enterprise" element of the Howey test is
satisfied because users enter a network composed of like-minded users who
all have a common desire to continue the block chain and add to Bitcoin's
value.5' Bitcoin may have "horizontal" commonality because the fortunes
of all individual users are tied together; each individual user is better off
when the value of Bitcoin rises and worse off when the value of Bitcoin
drops. 52 Bitcoin may not have "vertical commonality," on the other hand,
because the fortune of each individual user is not tied to the expertise of a
sole "promoter," especially since no single entity manages the entire
Bitcoin community. 53
The last two prongs of Howey are also in dispute. With regards to an
"expectation of profits," most Bitcoin movement involves investors,
speculators, and traders reacting to price fluctuations, seeking a return on
their investment. Yet, despite this fact, the "expectation of profits" element
may not be satisfied because the primary purpose for Bitcoin is the
facilitation of commercial exchange. 4 Moreover, "the efforts of others"
prong may also point in either direction. On the one hand, Bitcoin's
profitability does not depend on the efforts of others because private users
control every aspect of a transfer;55 but, on the other hand, Bitcoin users
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (establishing that a Bitcoin-based fund is a security, subject to
the SEC's rules and regulations).
50. Grinberg, supra note 5, at 196-97. But see Dion, supra note 3, at 183-84
(suggesting that Bitcoins involve investments of CPU power for solving block chains,
more so than investments of money).
51. See Grinberg, supra note 5, at 197 (indicating that Bitcoin has horizontal
commonality because everyone is proportionally better off when the value of Bitcoin
increases).
52. Id.; see Kaplanov, supra note 6, at 160 (stating that there is a "common
enterprise of software developers who maintain bitcoin's value").
53. Grinberg, supra note 5, at 197. But see Jose Pagliary, Bitcoin Flaw Could Let
Group Take Control of Currency, CNN MONEY (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/04/technology/bitcoin-flaw/ (reporting that according to
a Cornell study, a single group may be able to control Bitcoin).
54. See, e.g., John William Nelson, Why Bitcoin Isn't a Security Under Federal
Securities Law, LEX TECHNOLOGIAE (June 26, 2011 11:49 PM), http://
www.lextechnologiae.com/2011/06/26/why-bitcoin-isnt-a-security-under-federal-
securities-law (arguing that securities laws do not apply to Bitcoin because Bitcoin is
used for commercial exchange).
55. Grinberg, supra note 5, at 162-63.
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play no active role in the system's management or overall viability. 56
Lastly, the SEC may choose to classify Bitcoin as a security due to its
similarity to pyramid schemes.5 7 Since its inception, Bitcoin has sought to
lure new users into a "common enterprise," involving both Bitcoin users
and developers. The entire Bitcoin system lacks intrinsic value because its
value depends only on the willingness of users to accept it.58 Therefore,
like a pyramid scheme, the more users that are brought into the system, the
more likely it is that original users receive greater returns because the
demand for bitcoins will rise, leading to an increased value for each
individual bitcoin.
B. Compared to the United States, the U.K., Brazil, and Japan Represent
Varying Degrees ofFlexibility for Securities Regulation.
The U.K.'s approach to securities regulation is quite exclusive, and the
"securities" concept under U.S. laws is most akin to the "investment"
concept in the U.K.'s Financial Services and Markets Act ("FSMA").5 9
Although the FSMA provides a general definition for "investment,"
whether a particular instrument constitutes an "investment" depends on a
two-part analysis. 60 First, the activity must fall into the categories of
investments enumerated in Part II of Schedule 2 of the FSMA; and second,
the activity associated with the investment must be a "regulated activity."61
The first step in the "investment" analysis is whether an instrument falls
within the "specified" categories of investment in Part II of Schedule 2 of
the FSMA.62 This section includes "specified" categories including, but
56. Grinberg, supra note 5, 197-99 (noting that it is up to the developers of
Bitcoin to ultimately keep the system going).
57. Cf VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2012),
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en
.pdf ("Therefore, although the current knowledge base does not make it easy to assess
whether or not the Bitcoin system actually works like a pyramid or Ponzi scheme, it
can justifiably be stated that Bitcoin is a high-risk system for its users from a financial
perspective, and that it could collapse if people try to get out of the system and are not
able to do so because of its illiquidity.").
58. See Forbes, supra note 7 (characterizing Bitcoin as a currency that is different
from typical government-backed currencies because it has no intrinsic or "fixed" value
and therefore, its real value is based entirely on what others are willing to pay for it).
59. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (U.K.) (regulating securities
markets in the U.K.); see Frederick H. C. Mazando, Taxonomy of Global Securities: Is
the U.S. Definition of a Security too Broad?, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 121, 150-51
(2012).
60. See Mazando, supra note 54, at 151.
61. See id.
62. § 22(2), sch. 2.
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not limited to, stocks, deposits, electronic money, and options.63 Under the
FSMA, "specified" is defined as "specified in an order made by the
Treasury."6 Therefore, a "security" may include any instrument falling
within the definitions of these enumerated categories,65 or any other
instrument that the Treasury defines as an investment.66
The second step in the "investment" analysis is whether an activity is a
"regulated activity." 6 7 In order to constitute a "regulated activity," two
requirements must be satisfied: (1) the activity must be geographically
linked to the U.K. "by way of business," 68 and (2) the activity must relate
to an investment of a "specified" kind.69 Overall, the FSMA considers the
following activities to be "regulated activities," among others: dealing in
investments, arranging deals or managing investments, and establishing
collective investment schemes.7 0
Brazil, on the other hand, adopts a fairly liberal approach compared to
both the U.K. and the United States. Essentially, Brazil's definition for
"security" is more inclusive because its category for "investment contracts"
has fewer requirements than the Howey test.7' In 2001, Brazil codified the
Howey test language into its Capital Market Law, rather than developing
the test through litigation. 7 2 Article 2 of The Brazilian Capital Market Law
provides the following category: "(i) when publicly offered, any other
collective investment instrument or contract that creates the right of
participation on profits or remuneration, including those resulting from the
rendering of services, and whose profits derive from the efforts of the
entrepreneur or from the efforts of any third parties."73
63. Id.; see Mazando, supra note 54, at 152 (listing the classes and categories of
"specified" investments in Part II Schedule 2 of the FSMA); see also Robert C. Rosen
& Gordon R. Walker, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 8: UK-1-18-1-19
(Thomas Reuters/West, 10/2012).
64. § 22(5).
65. See Mazando, supra note 54, at 152 (explaining that "enumerated category"
applies to all those categories in Part II of Schedule 2 of the FSMA or categories
specified in secondary legislation).
66. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 22(5) (U.K.).
67. § 22(1).
68. §§ 19, 22(1); see Mazando, supra note 54, at 151 (describing the first
requirement as both a geographic test and a business test).
69. § 22(1)(a)-(b).
70. See § 22(2), sch. 2, arts. 2-9(A); see Mazando, supra note 54, at 151
(providing a list of regulated activities barred without prior FSMA authorization).
71. Law No. 10,303 of 2001 (Braz.).
72. Marcus Best & Jean-Luc Soullier, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
HANDBOOK 93 (Kluwer Law International, 3rd ed. 2010).
73. Law No. 10,303, art. 2.
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Like the Howey test, this category requires an investment instrument or
contract that creates: (1) a right to share in the profits from (2) the efforts of
an entrepreneur or any third parties. 4 These two elements are similar to
the last two elements of the Howey test: (1) an expectation of profits from
(2) the efforts of others;75 yet, unlike the Howey test, this broad category
does not require an investment of money, nor does it require the presence
of a "common enterprise." 7 6
Lastly, although Japanese financial regulations have been primarily
modeled after U.S. laws,77 the Japanese definition for "security" is the most
inclusive.78 According to the Japanese Financial Instruments and Exchange
Act ("FIEA"), the term "security" means any "right" with economic
characteristics or features. 79 The FIEA provides a long list of equity and
debt instruments, which are commonly known as securities.so The FIEA
also includes a broad category that may allow for Bitcoin regulation.8 1
This category suggests that, when taking into account various factors such
as liquidity and the extent to which a particular novel instrument has
similar economic characteristics to those securities listed within the FIEA,
the Japanese Cabinet may choose to regulate a "right" as a security if it
deems that such regulation is "necessary to secure the public interest or the
protection of investors." 82
C. Despite Such Differing Jurisdictional Approaches, Bitcoin Does Not Fit
Squarely within the Laws of the UK., Brazil, or Japan.
Bitcoin is unlikely to fall within the scope of the U.K. definition because
74. Id.; Robert C. Rosen & Gordon R. Walker, International Securities Regulation
4: JP-4-JP-5 (Thomas Reuters/West, 10/2012) (explaining that although various
Japanese laws in the 19th and 2 0th century were modeled after European laws, the end
of World War II created a shift for securities regulation and now most Japanese
financial laws are substantially influenced by Anglo-American law).
75. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946).
76. Law No. 10,303.
77. See Rosen & Walker, supra note 74, at 4: JP 4-5(explaining that although
various Japanese laws in the 19th and 20t" century were modeled after European laws,
the end of World War II created a shift for securities regulation and now most Japanese
financial laws are substantially influenced by Anglo-American law).
78. Financial Instruments and Exchange Act [FIEA], Law No. 25 of 2006, art. I
(Japan).
79. Id. art. 2; see generally Rosen & Walker, supra note 74 (giving a broad
overview of the Japanese statutory definition for securities).
80. FIEA, art. 1; see Rosen & Walker, supra note 74, at 4: JP-19-JP-20 (listing
and discussing all of the enumerated categories of securities that fall under Article I of
the FIEA).
81. FIEA, art. 1, para. 1, xxi.
82. Id,; Rosen & Walker, supra note 74, at 4: JP- 19-JP-20.
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securities are confined to those instruments specifically enumerated within
the FSMA, depriving regulators of the opportunity to interpret a broad
category, like that of "investment contracts" under the U.S. regulatory
83ThFSregime. The FSMA's list includes instruments that are commonly held to
be securities by most jurisdictions, and Bitcoin is so novel that it is not yet
commonly recognized as a security. The FSMA does, however, include
one potential category under which Bitcoin may fall: the FSMA lists
''electronic money" as a specified category within its investment
definition. 84 Because Bitcoin has been regarded as a form of digital
currency used to buy goods and services online, it may easily fit within this
specified category of investments; however, the particular scope of
Bitcoin's regulation under the FSMA will ultimately depend on the type of
Bitcoin activity that is conducted.
In order to qualify as a "regulated activity" under the FSMA, an activity
must be geographically linked to the U.K. "by way of business."ss Many
factors determine whether an activity is carried on "by way of business.",86
Some of these factors include the activity's degree of continuity and the
existence of a commercial element.87 Generally, it is difficult to argue that
one's activities do not satisfy the business element of the "regulated
activity" test, as most companies dealing with the specified categories of
investments discussed in the FSMA are carrying on some sort of
business;88 however, the FSMA specifically lists "issuing electronic
money" as the only type of "regulated activity" associated with the
"specified" category of electronic money. 89  For this reason, under the
FSMA's definition, regulating Bitcoin may be limited only to those
individuals who partake in the issuance of individual bitcoins, that is, large
Bitcoin exchanges.
In contrast, Bitcoin has a better chance of falling within the scope of the
Brazilian definition for security. As previously mentioned, in order to fall
within the scope of Brazil's definition, Bitcoin must constitute an
investment agreement that (1) creates a right for its users to share in the
profits, depending on (2) the efforts of a third party.90 This second element
83. Mazando, supra note 54, at 156-57 (describing the FSMA's limited scope
when defining a "security").
84. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, cmt. 8, § 22(2), sch. 2, (U.K.).
85. FSMA, §§ 19, 22(l).
86. Mazando, supra note 54, at 151.
87. Id.
88. See Rosen & Walker, supra note 58, at UK-1-17 (arguing that it is generally
hard for anyone to argue that their activities relating to specified instruments are not by
way of business).
89. FSMA, § 22(2), sch. 2; Rosen & Walker, supra note 58, at UK-1-17.
90. Law No. 10,303 of 2001 (Braz.).
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is similar to the fourth element of the Howey test, and therefore, a similar
analysis may be used: although private users control every aspect of a
Bitcoin transfer, Bitcoin's management, profitability, and viability depend
solely on the program's developers, which ultimately satisfies the "efforts
of a third party" element in the Brazilian regulatory system.
Contrastingly, the first element of the Brazilian definition is not easily
satisfied with regards to Bitcoin. The Brazilian definition of security
requires a right to share in the profits, not just an expectation, as stated
under the Howey test.9 ' This difference in language suggests that there
may be a contractual component involved. As such, the Bitcomi system
does not contractually guarantee a right to its users; Bitcoin users enter the
system at their own risk without any guarantees from Bitcoin's developers.
Despite this disputed element, however, the Brazilian definition still does
away with the "common enterprise" element-the hardest element to
satisfy under the Howey test-which shows that Bitcoin is, nonetheless,
more likely to fall within the scope of Brazilian securities regulations, than
U.S. securities regulations.
Lastly, Bitcoin regulation may be easiest in Japan. The FlEA ultimately
allows the Japanese Cabinet to regulate any "right" as a security if, after
taking into account factors such as the liquidity and the extent to which a
particular novel instrument has similar economic characteristics to those
securities listed within the FIEA, the Cabinet deems such regulation
"necessary to secure the public interest or the protection of investors." 92
First, bitcoins have similar economic characteristics to typical securities.
Most securities, like stocks and bonds, have no intrinsic value because their
value is derived from some other underlying valuable asset. Likewise,
bitcoins do not have intrinsic value because their value is based entirely on
supply and demand.93 Second, bitcoins resemble investments because the
vast majority of activity in the Bitcoin market involves the movement of
bitcoins through investors and traders on Bitcoin exchanges, and this
activity is based on speculation regarding Bitcoin's fluctuating market
price.94
Additionally, Bitcoin liquidity is quite limited because the entire system
9 1. Id.
92. Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Law No. 25 of 2006, art. 1, para. 1,
xxi (Japan).
93. Forbes, supra note 7.
94. See Carter Dougherty, Wall Street Bitcoin Fans Try to Make Real Money from
Virtual, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6,2014 10:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
01 -06/wall-street-bitcoin-fans-seek-to-make-real-money-from-virtual.html (stating that
most Bitcoin enthusiasts are buying and holding the currency, betting that it will rise in
value, while others are engaging in other types of investment activities such as trading,
exchanging or storing bitcoins).
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is designed so that there will only ever be a total of 21 million bitcoins in
circulation.9 5 This limited liquidity means that Bitcoin merchants cannot
comfortably sell their orders at a known or predictable price, and therefore,
a sizable sell order itself could have the potential to drive down the entire
market price for bitcoins. 96 Due to Bitcoin's illiquid nature, which may
give rise to large price fluctuations, the Japanese Cabinet may deem
Bitcoin regulation necessary for the protection of investors.
That being said, if one were to adhere to a strict interpretation of the
FIEA, Bitcoin may actually fall outside the scope of the Japanese
definition, as well. Like the Brazilian definition of a "security," the FEIA
uses the term "right"-not expectation-when defining a "security."97 This
suggests that there is a contractual component involved, and the Bitcoin
system does not contractually guarantee any rights to its users, but rather
bitcoin users enter the system at their own risk without any guarantees from
the system's developers. Therefore, Bitcoin may also fall outside the
Japanese definition.
With such uncertainties for Bitcoin, the next Part provides a solution to
domestic Bitcoin regulation. It recommends that the SEC regulate Bitcoin
as a "quasi-security," subjecting it to some reporting requirements, but not
others.
III. SOLUTION: BITCOIN AS A "QUASI-SECURITY"
Despite the varying approaches to securities regulation analyzed in Part
III, there is no existing definition that easily incorporates Bitcoin into
existing laws. Although the United States has created a broad definition for
securities, Brazil's definition eliminates two key requirements.
Contrastingly, the U.K. definition is the most exclusive, as it contains no
broad category and allows regulation only of those instruments specifically
enumerated within the FSMA. Finally, the Japanese definition adopts the
most inclusive approach, allowing the regulation of any economic right that
the Japanese Cabinet deems necessary to protect the public interest; yet, as
previously mentioned, even this inclusive approach may give rise to
uncertainties for Bitcoin regulation.
Generally speaking, amending the Howey test to mirror any of the
definitions analyzed in this Note would prove particularly unhelpful as a
proper regulatory solution to Bitcoin regulation, especially since bitcoins
95. See Robert MacGregor, Bitcoin is Money... It's Just Terrible At It, YAHOO
FINANCE (Jul. 29, 2013 4:57 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/
bitcoin-money-just-terrible-205752180.html (explaining that due to Bitcoin's illiquid
nature, the very act of disposing or selling Bitcoins may devalue them).
96. Id.
97. FIEA, art. 1.
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themselves do not fall squarely within any approach. The Howey test has
become a useful guide for courts when determining whether unorthodox
investments fall within the scope of existing federal securities legislation.
Therefore, amending Howey to facilitate the inclusion of digital financial
instruments like Bitcoin may not only retroactively affect the status of other
unorthodox instruments, but also, it may burden various agencies that have
relied on this test for so long.
If amending existing securities regulations is not the proper approach to
Bitcoin regulation, then what is? I argue that the United States and other
jurisdictions should create new laws to successfully regulate Bitcoin as a
"quasi-security." As an agency whose primary mission is to protect
investors from risky investments that are not fully understood by the
general public, the SEC should study the various risks associated with
Bitcoin and decide whether it should extend certain requirements to bitcoin
transactions and bitcoin-based products.
Ideally, the SEC should extend regulations to key actors in the Bitcoin
community, requiring such entities to either register themselves or disclose
material information. For example, the SEC could require large bitcoin
wallet holders to register themselves, especially if they are in the business
of buying and selling bitcoins. Similarly, the SEC could compel exchanges
to periodically report large transactions, especially those transactions that
are large enough to substantially alter the market value of bitcoins and
create devastating losses for bitcoin users. It could require exchanges to
disclose material facts regarding the amount of Bitcoin traffic in a day as
well as any attacks or attempted attacks on the entire network. Lastly, the
SEC could also resort to indirect control over Bitcoin by imposing amount
limutations on individuals and/or entities that invest using bitcoins, as well
as, establishing capital requirements on trading houses, banks, and other
entities that hold bitcoins.
CONCLUSION
If not properly regulated, Bitcoin has the potential to create a disruptive
and risky new global monetary system. Bitcoin not only poses grave
money-laundering dangers, but also, it has the tendency to result in drastic
price fluctuations, which may create various risks for users and investors in
bitcoin-based financial products. Notably, regulators should seek a
solution that will provide proper oversight and investor protection, without
discouraging economic growth and investment.
502 Vol. 3:3
KEEP IT SECRET; KEEP IT SAFE: A
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"BRIC" TRADE SECRET REGIMES
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As the global economy recovers from the 2008 financial crisis, it has
become paramount for companies to protect their intellectual property
assets abroad. This is especially true in countries that are notorious for
lackluster statutory protection and inefficient policing and enforcement.
This Note seeks to advise practitioners on the domestic trade secret
regimes of Brazil, Russia, India, and China - collectively the BRICs. In
this difficult economic climate, both the importance of trade secrets and
the threat of misappropriation increase. In addition to outlining
relevant domestic trade secret statutory provisions, this Note expounds
on the most dangerous aspects inside each BRIC country. Finally, this
Note explains which of the four BRIC countries is the safest and which
represents the largest risk to American multinational enterprises that
export their trade secrets and other intellectual property.
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INTRODUCTION
In late 2003, the large investment bank Goldman Sachs released a paper
entitled "Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050."' The authors
forecasted - quite optimistically - the rise of the "BRIC economies," an
acronym that refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.2 Using a number of
projection factors, such as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita,
and GDP averages, the authors predicted that the BRICs would become a
much more powerful, if not the most powerful, global economic force by
2050.3
To an extent, these predictions are on point - as of 2012, all of the
BRICs have secured their positions as four of the top ten international
economies.4 Despite this monumental growth, not even the BRIC
1. Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path
to 2050, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No. 99 (2003) available at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf.
2. See id at 4 (forecasting that by 2040, the BRIC nations could be worth more in
dollar terms than the G6, which is comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Italy, France, Germany, and Japan).
3. See id. at 9 (predicting collective BRIC GDP to top the economic scales at
US$ 84,201 billion in 2050); see also Six Global Trends Shaping the Business World:
Emerging Markets Increase Their Global Power, ERNST & YOUNG,
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Business-environment/Six-global-trends-shaping-the-
business-world-Emerging-markets-increase-their-global-power (last visited Oct. 6,
2013) ("By 2020, the BRICs are expected to account for nearly 50% of all global GDP
growth. Securing a strong base in these countries will be critical for investors seeking
growth beyond them.").
4. See, e.g., Gross Domestic Product 2012, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 17, 2013)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (ranking China second, Brazil
seventh, the Russian Federation as eighth, and India as tenth).
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economies were shielded from the economic recession of 2008.5 One
resounding effect of the global recession on the BRIC countries was a loss
of foreign direct investment (FDI); all four countries saw a dramatic drop
from 2008 to 2009.6 Regardless of this temporary stagnation, FDI into
some of the BRICs has picked up since 2009, and the four countries remain
prominent targets for companies wishing to take advantage of the emerging
markets?
Expansion into these countries can be a risky endeavor on many fronts,
and this Note seeks to expound on one of them: the threat of trade secret
misappropriation abroad. Companies inside of the United States have
grown comfortable utilizing the extensive legal protections afforded to
trade secrets by both state and federal law.8 Unfortunately, this level of
protection is not available in the BRIC countries - in fact, each country
ranks among the worst for intellectual property protection. 9 American
multinational enterprises (MNEs) must tread carefully when exporting their
5. See GDP Growth (Annual %), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (presenting the
differences in GDP growth rate for the BRICs before and after the global recession).
6. FDI in Figures, THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 2 (Apr. 2013) available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20
in%20figures.pdf.
7. See id. (showing large increases in FDI for China and Brazil and small
decreases for Russia and India); see also Merrill Matthews, Companies "Outsource"
Because That's Where the Sales Are, FORBES (July 20, 2012, 3:20 PM),
http://www. forbes-.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/07/20/companies-outsource-
because-thats-where-the-sales-are/ (arguing that the reason why companies like
Caterpillar and GE conduct almost fifty percent of their business abroad is because
many expanding countries are experiencing a blooming middle class, creating new,
profitable markets for U.S. companies).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) (noting that every state
has adopted some form of trade secret protection, most of which were modeled after
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the origin being common law tort); see generally Theft
of Trade Secrets 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West 2012) ("Whoever, with intent to convert a
trade secret, that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner
thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade
secret, knowingly ... steals ... such information"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1
(1985).
9. See Measuring Momentum: Global Intellectual Property Center International
IP Index, UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 24 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/measuring-momentum-the-gipc-international-ip-
index/ [hereinafter GIPC International IP Index] (ranking the United States as the most
effective protector of IP rights, while listing Russia, Brazil, China, and India as the
least effective in a report that examined different factors such as patent and related
rights, copyright and related rights, and membership to international intellectual
property treaties).
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trade secrets into these lucrative markets.' 0
This Note acts as a practitioner's guide to navigating the complex, and
often times threadbare, trade secret regimes of the BRIC nations. Part II
introduces the applicable laws and statutory provisions that provide
protection to trade secrets in each country. Part III analyzes the BRIC trade
secret regimes by presenting the best and worst aspects of each country's
laws. Furthermore, it identifies both signs of improvement in each BRIC
country, and diagnoses what each country must do if it wishes to become a
safe, viable target for expanding foreign businesses. Part IV provides
advice for American MNEs that wish to expand into the BRICs by
determining which, out of the four, is the safest in regards to trade secret
and intellectual property protection. Finally, this Note concludes that it is
an economic reality that the BRIC countries have reached a level of
prominence that used to be reserved for Western, capitalist systems - it
falls on the shoulders of each BRIC country to establish trade secret
protection worthy of their new, preeminent position in the global arena.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT DOMESTIC TRADE SECRET LAWS OF
BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA
With the exception of India, each BRIC country has promulgated
domestic trade secret protection in one form or another - largely holding to
three common factors present in many trade secret definitions: (1) the
information is not known to the public, (2) the subject confers economic
benefit through its secrecy and confidentiality, and (3) the information is
subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy." In Brazil, trade secrets
receive minor protection under Article Five, Section XXIX of the Federal
Constitution and Article 195 of the country's Industrial Property Law,
which was passed in 1996.12 In Russia, Article 1465 of Part Four of the
Russian Civil Code and the Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy protect
10. See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 317, 317 (2006) (lamenting that in the BRIC economies,
intellectual property misappropriation ranges from "rampant to merely widespread").
I1. Zafar Mahfooz Nomani and Faizanur Rahman, Intellection of Trade Secret and
Innovation Laws in India, 16 J. INTELLEC. PROP. RIGHTS 341, 341-42 (July, 2011).
12. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL [C.F.] art. 5, Sec.
XXIX (Braz.) available at http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStflnternacional/
portalStfSobreCorte enus/anexo/constituicao-ingles-3ed20.pdf; Law No. 9,279, of
May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law), DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] of May,
14 1996 (Braz.) available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=125397;
see also Robert M. Sherwood, Trade Secret Protection: Help for a Treacherous
Journey, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 67, 73-74 (2008) (giving a detailed history of the
development of Brazilian trade secret law, which is rooted in the rules that governed
medieval German trade guilds).
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trade secrets to an extent.' 3 India proves to be the outlier, and does not
provide any statutory protection for trade secrets. 14 In China, trade secrets
enjoy fairly thorough protection under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of
the People's Republic of China.' 5  This Part lays out the applicable
statutory provisions for each country, and identifies what kinds of trade
secrets are afforded protection.
A. Domestic Trade Secret Law ofBrazil
Article Five, Section XXII of Brazil's Federal Constitution guarantees
the right to property. Further, Section XXIX of the same Article provides
in part that, "the law shall ensure . .. protection of industrial
creations . . ."6 This is augmented by the Industrial Property Law, which
criminalizes the misappropriation of trade secrets - the text of Title V,
Chapter VI, Article 195, Section XI states, in part, that a crime of unfair
competition has been perpetrated by anyone who "divulges, exploits, or
utilizes, without authorization ... confidential knowledge," if that
knowledge can be used in industry and is not publically known.17 Section
XII extends this protection to information that is obtained by illicit means
or fraud.'8
Sections XI and XII provide protection to any "knowledge, information,
or data" which has a use in industry or commerce, so long as it is not
known to the public and would not be readily ascertainable by someone
13. CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION art. 1465 (Russ.) available at
http://www.rupto.ru/rupto/nfile/3b05468f-4b25-llel-36f8-9c8e9921fb2c/CivilCode
.pdf; Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy, RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF
LEGISLATION 2004, No. 98-FZ, item 3283 available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?filejid=202527.
14. See, e.g., Sonia Baldia, Offshoring to India: Are Your Trade Secrets and
Confidential Information Protected?, MARTINDALE.COM, (Mar. 1, 2010)
http://www.martindale.com/business-law/articleMayer-Brown-LLP_921758.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013) (explaining that India, unlike the United States, does not provide
protection for trade secrets or other IP rights, and instead relies on tort and contract
common law).
15. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993),
art. 10, 1993 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China) available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306.
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL [C.F.] art. 5, Sec.
XXIX (Braz.) available at
http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStflntemacional/portalStfSobreCorteenus
/anexo/constituicao-ingles 3ed20 I 0.pdf.
17. Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law) at Title V, Chapter
VI, art. 195, § XI.
18. Id. at art. 195, § XII.
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well versed in the field, which sets an obviousness standard not seen in the
other BRIC countries or the United States.' 9 This sweeping definition does
not limit the scope of the law by enumerating a list of eligible subjects. In
this respect, it is similar to the protection offered in the United States.20
Brazilian law is implicated in the event of misappropriation through breach
of a contractual relationship, illicit means, or fraud, which closely mimics
U.S. law. 2 1
B. Domestic Trade Secret Law ofRussia
In Russia, trade secret protection derives its authority in part from
Chapter 75, Part Four of Russia's Civil Code - outlining the subject matter
as, "[I]nformation of any type . .. including ... methods . . . having real or
potential commercial value because it is unknown to third persons, to
which such persons have no legal open access and with respect to which
the owner ... has introduced a regime of trade secret."22 Article 1472 of
the same chapter defines misappropriation, stating that infringement of the
exclusive right to a secret of production occurs when "a person who has
illegally received information constituting a secret of production ...
disclose[s] or use[s] this information ... ."23 Article 1472 extends liability
to those who have breached a commitment to maintain confidentiality, and
halfheartedly describes the penalty for a breach.24 The inclusive definitions
of both subject matter and scope of misappropriation are similar to those in
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in the United States. 25
The Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy expands on the trade secret
protection outlined in Part Four of the Russian Civil Code. It regulates the
establishment, amendment, and termination of the regime of commercial
secrecy - a set of requirements that must be met before a piece of
information can qualify as a trade secret. 26  In order for a piece of
information to qualify as a trade secret, it must meet the definition included
in Chapter 75, Part Four of the Civil Code, and have the regime of
19. Id. at art. 195, § XI.
20. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 37 (explaining that the Uniform
Trade Secret Act protects any information, so long as that information adds value to its
owner and is not publically known).
21. Compare Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law) at Title
V, Chapter VI, art. 195, §§ XI-XII, with 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
22. CIVIL CODE OF THE RussIAN FEDERATION art. 1465 (Russ.).
23. Id. at art. 1472.
24. See id. (requiring those guilty of infringement to pay damages to the owner of
the exclusive right to the secret of production, but omitting a method to calculate an
amount).
25. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).
26. Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy, 2004, No. 98-FZ, item 3283.
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commercial secrecy introduced, a process described in Article 10 of the
Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy. 2 7 Once the process is complete, the
information will fall within the purview of Russian trade secret law and
gain protection.
C. Domestic Trade Secret Law ofIndia
India is unique in the BRIC context because it is the only country out of
the four that does not provide specific statutory protection for trade secrets,
instead, it relies on its British common law tradition of tort and contract
law. 28 Understandably, this dearth of trade secret protection presents a
dangerous environment for American MNEs, the intricacies of which will
be analyzed in Part III of this Note.
D. Domestic Trade Secret Law of China
Unlike India, China has passed an array of laws that protect proprietary
information and trade secrets. In 1993, China passed the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, which is the keystone
of the country's trade secret protection.2 9 While it is accompanied by a
number of different laws that touch on trade secrecy to a lesser degree, 30
Article 10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law provides definitions for
both trade secrets and misappropriation. Referred to as "Business Secrecy"
by the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, trade secrets are defined as, "utilized
technical information and business information which is unknown by the
public, which may create business interests or profit for its legal owners,
and also is [kept secret] by its legal owners."31
27. See id. (describing that an owner must provide a list of the information,
establish a procedure to limit access to the information, keep a record of people
allowed access to the commercial secret, regulate employee use, and affix an official
"Commercial Secret" stamp upon material media and documents).
28. See, e.g., Baldia, supra note 14 (detailing that the absence of statutory
protections can place US firm's IP at risk if it does not carefully employ contractual
mechanisms or rely on the common law tort of breach of confidence in the absence of a
contract); see also Nomani and Rahman, supra note 11, at 345 ("There are no specific
laws in India to protect trade secrets and confidential information. Nevertheless, Indian
courts have upheld trade secret protection on [the] basis of principles of equity, and
common law action of breach of confidence and contractual obligation").
29. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 10, 1993
STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China).
30. See J. Benjamin Bai and Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secret Protection in
China, 9 Nw J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 356-57 (2011) (detailing the relevant
provisions of Chinese Contract Law, Company Law, Labor Law, and Labor Contract
Law that allow an owner of a trade secret to impose confidentiality agreements upon
employees).
31. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 10, 1993
STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China).
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Article 10 also provides a comprehensive three-part misappropriation
provision. The first sentence prohibits theft, coercion, and the use of any
other unfair method to obtain another's business secrets; the second
sentence makes it illegal to disclose or permit others to use the business
secret without authorization; and the third sentence incorporates the breach
of contract into China's definition of trade secret misappropriation. 32
Accordingly, in order to prevail in a Chinese trade secret action, the
elements that must be proven are extremely similar to those in the United
States.33
II. ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC BRIC TRADE SECRET REGIMES: THE
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS
This Part examines the pros and cons of each BRIC country's domestic
trade secret regimes, paying especially close attention to the intricacies of
each system and the facts that savvy MNEs should consider before
exporting their trade secrets abroad.
A. Analysis ofBrazilian Trade Secret Law: An Adequate Law with
Inadequate Penalties
Despite the fact that the Brazilian Industrial Property Law does not
expressly define trade secrets under that name, the law criminalizes the
theft of confidential business information.34 While Brazil's law does
provide a large scope of subject matter eligible for protection, there are a
number of glaring shortcomings associated with Brazilian intellectual
property and trade secret protection, earning the country a poor
reputation.3 5
32. Id.
33. See e.g., Bai and Da, supra note 30, at 356 (outlining the elements as: (1) the
trade secret is not publically known, (2) the trade secret provides economic benefit, (3)
the trade secret is subject to reasonable measures to maintain secrecy, and (4) there is
misappropriation by a "wrongdoer or third party"); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(1985).
34. George Charles Fischer, Trade Secret Protection in Brazil, LATIN AMERICAN
LAW & BUSINESs REPORT 7, 8 (June 30, 1998), available at
http://www.fischerforster.com.br/midia/pdf/20090326161920_TradeSecretProtectionin
Brazil.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) (explaining that even though the law does not
use the phrase "trade secret", three elements are discernable: competitive advantage,
novelty, and secrecy). See generally Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial
Property Law), at Title V, Chapter VI, art. 195.
35. See GIPC International IP Index, supra note 9, at 5, 24 (ranking Brazil third
from last on overall IP protection); see also The Two Faces of Intellectual Property in
Brazil, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (March 1, 2006) http://knowledge.wharton.upenn
.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1339 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (quoting Kenneth
Adelman, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, saying "Brazil is a
prominent member of the IP axis of evil").
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The first and most obvious problem associated with Brazilian trade
secret law is its statutory penalty. Article 195 of the Industrial Property
Law states that one guilty of trade secret misappropriation faces between
three months to one year in prison, or a fine of an undisclosed amount. 36
This minor penalty pales in comparison to those mandated under United
States law, raising questions of the law's deterrent efficacy.37 Moreover,
the law does not specify the availability of either civil damages or
injunctive relief, which adds more uncertainty as to which remedies can be
sought.38
Another noteworthy factor involves varying reports as to who can be
charged with a crime of unfair competition. While the law itself says that
anyone who "divulges, exploits, or utilizes, without authorization,
confidential knowledge . . ." perpetrates a crime of unfair competition,
existing literature claims that Article 195 of the Industrial Property Law
simply added parties that can be found liable. 3 9 If the literature is correct,
limiting those who can be held liable for trade secret misappropriation
reduces the law's effectiveness.
Finally, the Brazilian judicial system itself can be an impediment to
effective trade secret protection. The system is plagued with dysfunction
caused by undue delays and the high cost of litigation.4 0 Corruption is
present in some areas, and decisions regarding trade secret protection can
be of poor quality due to the fact that very few cases have been brought.4 1
36. Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law), at Title V, Chapter
VI, art. 195.
37. See Theft of Trade Secrets 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012) (setting the penalty for
trade secret misappropriation at ten years imprisonment or up to $5 million in fines).
38. See e.g., Trade Secret Theft: Managing the Growing Threat in Supply Chains,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE 1, 17 (2012), available at
http://www.create.org/news-resources/resources/trade-secret-theft-supply-chains
[hereinafter CREATE.ORG] (lamenting the uncertain nature of remedies in Brazilian
law and reporting that trade secret protection is poorly established).
39. Compare Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law), at Title
V, Chapter VI, art. 195, with Protection of trade secrets through IPR and unfair
competition law, INT'L Ass'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. I (Mar. 31, 2010)
available at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/215/GR215brazil.pdf
(answering that one bringing a case in Brazil may hold the contractual partner,
employee or ex-employee, employer, or the partner or administrator of another
company who accessed the information through fraud liable for an unfair competition
charge).
40. See, e.g., GIPC International IP Index, supra note 9, at 39 (reporting that it
can take up to four years for a case to reach trial and often times a decade before
litigation is complete).
41. See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment
Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261,
295-99 (1997) (explaining in two parts that judicial integrity has been an issue in many
highly-publicized cases and that the lack of trade secret jurisprudence leaves many
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So, while Brazil does have an adequate trade secret law in place, the
country needs to increase the penalties and remedies available, clarify who
can be indicted, and overhaul its slow judiciary.
B. Analysis ofRussian Trade Secret Law: A Trade Secret Regime with
Questionable Government Intentions
Like Brazil, Russia's trade secret laws appear to be inclusive - Part Four
of the Civil Code provides a sweeping scope of covered subject matter and
a solid definition of misappropriation.42 Yet, the country is still notorious
for poor trade secret protection.43
To begin with, there are a number of statutory issues that should be taken
into account by any MNE expanding into Russia. First, is the lack of
remedies available - the statute provides for damages, but is silent when it
comes to injunctive relief or criminal charges.4 Unlike other countries, the
Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy requires trade secret owners to
affirmatively "introduce the regime of commercial secrecy" - a list of steps
that must be taken in order to achieve statutory protection.4 5 In addition to
these steps, the Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy includes another
troubling measure - Article 6 gives the Russian government carte blanche
authority to demand access to a company's trade secrets, with criminal
sanctions and court actions for those who do not comply.4 6
Certain realities outside the country's statutory regime are also extremely
troubling. Along with the provision allowing the Russian government to
demand a privately held trade secret, it is widely believed that Russia's
government is engaged in extensive cyber espionage.4 7 The clandestine
concepts undefined and vague).
42. CIvIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION art. 1465, 1472 (Russ.) (qualifying
"any [type of] information" as a trade secret and illegal use or disclosure as
misappropriation).
43. See, e.g., CREATE.ORG, supra note 38, at 7 (blaming Russia's high threat
level on poor police work, weak data privacy, and cybercrime).
44. CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION art. 1465, 1472 (Russ.).
45. Federal Law on Commercial Secrecy, RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF
LEGISLATION 2004, No. 98-FZ, item 3283 available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=202527 (listing the steps that must be taken in order to
introduce the regime of commercial secrecy).
46. See id. at art. 6.
47. See Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof Recent Developments in
Cyber Security, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 225, 259 (2013) (stating that Russia, along with
a number of other countries, is believed to be involved in cyber espionage, though to a
lesser degree than China); see also Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in
Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, 2009-2011, OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC. 6
(October, 2011), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecieall/
Foreign-EconomicCollection 2011 .pdf [hereinafter Foreign Spies Stealing U.S.
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attitudes of the Russian government present a risk to American MNEs
uncommon in other countries. 4 8 If this were not enough, the Russian police
force is infamous for failing to pursue reports of corporate data theft.49
Regardless of the seemingly comprehensive law, American MNEs that
expand into Russia face the possibility that their valuable trade secrets will
fall into the wrong hands or end up the property of the state.
C. Analysis ofIndian Trade Secret Law: The Absence of Statutory Regime
Leaves Protection Lacking
Out of the four BRIC countries, India is the only one that does not have
some form of statutory trade secret protection.50 This is not to say that one
cannot protect trade secrets in India - just that the protection available is
limited in so far as the parties who can be held liable.51 Although there is
not a codified definition of trade secrets in India, the Delhi High Court
recently recognized the concept in the case American Express Bank, Ltd. v.
Priya Puri.52
The problem in India is not that it lacks a statutory definition; instead the
judicially recognized definition can only be used in cases involving the
violation of contractual obligations or breach of confidence - both of which
require a preexisting relationship between the parties.53  Herein lies the
Economic Secrets] (asserting that because the United States is the leading global
economic innovator, foreign governments, including Russia, have a large incentive to
try and pilfer economic and trade secrets).
48. See GIPC International IP Index, supra note 9, at 67 (attributing weak trade
secret protection, in part, to widespread industrial espionage).
49. See e.g., CREATE.ORG, supra note 38, at 19 (revealing corruption and poor
skills among law enforcement to be the reasons behind the inefficient enforcement).
50. See, e.g., Baldia, supra note 14 (warning US businesses that the non-legal
environment for trade secrets in India provides a substantial risk if the proper
contractual mechanisms are not employed).
51. See, e.g., Nomani and Rahman, supra note 11, at 345 (recognizing that Indian
courts will protect trade secrets on the basis of equity, common law breach of
confidence, and violation of contractual obligation); see also Baldia, supra note 14
(explaining that the tort of breach of confidence only applies to fiduciaries and
contractual obligation only applies to those who have agreed not to misappropriate
trade secrets).
52. American Express Bank, Ltd. v. Puiya Puri, (2006) III LU 540, at page 2129,
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/445135/ ("A trade secret can be a formulae,
technical know-how or a peculiar mode or method of business adopted by an employer
which is unknown to others.").
53. See Baldia, supra note 14 (posing a hypothetical scenario in which an
American company has its trade secrets misappropriated by an Indian subcontractor
who has not entered into a contractual or fiduciary relationship with the American
company as an example of a situation where recovery would be impossible).
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danger of India's lack of trade secret regime: if an individual or entity that
has no prior relationship to the company misappropriates an American
MNE's trade secrets, there may be no route to recovery. 54
Considering this, it is important to utilize extensive contractual
protections when exporting trade secrets into India.55  But, even if every
contract is perfect, the risk of misappropriation by unknown third parties
who have no prior relationship still exists, in addition to the burdens
associated with a slow and archaic judicial system. 56 These factors make
India an inhospitable environment for trade secret exportation.
D. Analysis of Chinese Trade Secret Law: A Demonstrated Effort Despite
Government Enforcement Problems
Out of all the BRIC countries, China's trade secret regime may be
closest to the protection offered in the United States - both in scope and
definition of misappropriation.57  Despite this comprehensive regime, a
recent report found that, "China's growth has far outpaced its ability to
create and enforce legislation or - even more importantly - cultural
attitudes towards protecting digital privacy .... "ss
China's system, like Russia's, is rife with cyber espionage and
questionable government attempts at extracting trade secrets from foreign
companies.59 According to a 2011 US counterintelligence report, China's
trade secret theft is motivated by the need for economic growth and a desire
to compete with American firms. 60 This is a risk that lies outside of the
54. Id.
55. See id. (imploring US companies to insist on contractual provisions that bind
both Indian contractors and any subcontractors that are hired by them, making it clear
that the US company has a right to enforce any violation of these provisions).
56. See CREATE.ORG, supra note 38, at 18-19 (attributing Indian judicial
inefficiency to backlogged cases, hand kept court records, misplaced filings, and
cycling presiding judges); See generally Baldia, supra note 14.
57. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 10, 1993
STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT§ 1 (1985).
58. Unsecured Economies: Protecting Vital Information, MCAFEE, INC. 14 (2009),
available at http://resources.mcafee.com/content/NAUnsecuredEconomiesReport.
59. See Teplinsky, supra note 47, at 263 (explaining that proof has become public
that the Chinese government has engaged in cyberespionage against the United States,
including Coca Cola who owns one of the most famous trade secrets in the world); see
also CREATE.ORG, supra note 38, at 19 (relaying an experience that General Motors
had with the Chinese government where, in order to qualify for extensive government
subsidies, demands were made that the car maker transfer a number of engineering and
electronic trade secrets to Chinese officials; GM refused).
60. See Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets, supra note 47, at 4-5
(expounding on the fact that Chinese intelligence services and private entities often use
employees of US firms to steal confidential information using portable devices or
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country's statutory regime, and unfortunately, is difficult to mitigate.
Government corruption aside, there have been recent signs of hope from
the Chinese judiciary regarding the protection of American MINE's trade
secrets. Shanghai's No.1 Intermediate Court recently ruled for American
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly in an action against a former employee
from one of its Chinese subsidiaries.6 1 Judge Liu Junhua ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, using newly amended Article 100 of the PRC Civil Procedure
Law, which provides injunctive relief for trade secret cases. 62  This
anecdotal evidence reinforces the importance of contractual provisions that
mandate confidentiality.6 In addition, the United States and China
continue to hold talks regarding cyber espionage practices.6 4 One can hope
that the Eli Lilly case, along with the ongoing diplomacy, are signs of
things to come - a China where trade secrets are afforded the protection
they are due.
III. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO AMERICAN MNES INTENT ON
EXPANDING INTO THE BRICS
Each BRIC country carries a unique set of risks that must be balanced
against potential rewards. Every BRIC trade secret regime leaves much to
be desired, although many of the problems fall outside of the substantive
boundaries of the statutory structure. 65  After a detailed side-by-side
analysis of the four BRIC countries and their respective trade secret laws, it
is difficult to say which country provides the best protection to foreign
MNEs.6 6
email).
61. Christine Yiu & Yijun Ge, Eli Lilly v. Huang: Shanghai Court Issues
Interlocutory Injunction Against Breach of Trade Secret, BIRD & BIRD (Aug. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2013/china/eli-lilly-v-huang-
shanghai-court-issues-interlocutory-injunction-against-breach-of-trade-secret (stating
that Eli Lilly was successful in obtaining damages and an injunction against a forner
employee whose employment contract contained a thorough confidentiality agreement.
The former employee, known only as Huang, downloaded 21 confidential documents
without permission and refused to delete them when asked to do so).
62. Id.
63. See Dan Harris, How to Write a China Contract. Arbitration Versus Litigation.
Part II. Trade Secrets., CHINA LAW BLOG (Sept. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/09/how-to-write-a-china-contract-arbitration-
versus-litigation-part-ii-trade-secrets-baby.html (detailing the trial's takeaways for
foreign companies aiming to do business in China).
64. See Teplinsky, supra note 47, at 263 (explaining that diplomatic talks were
prompted after evidence of cyber espionage became public).
65. See generally GIPC International IP Index, supra note 9 (noting that each
BRIC country has difficulty enforcing the laws that are in place).
66. See id. at 5 (using the scoring method adopted by the study to show that
because each of the BRICs are ranked so low in IP protection, it is hard to pinpoint an
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For example, while China has the most promising and comprehensive
trade secret laws, it, nonetheless, suffers from abysmal enforcement
methods.6 7 Brazil's laws seem to protect trade secrets as well, but the
available damages and penalties are insufficient to justify a large risk.
Russia's laws are adequate, but available damages are unclear and the
intentions of the nation's government are, at times, questionable.6 9 India's
lack of trade secret law is troublesome, and relying on the traditional
contract or tort laws leaves companies vulnerable.7 0
This is an inexact science. Nevertheless, this Note seeks to make a
recommendation to practitioners. Even with all of its faults and failures,
China seems to be the best choice for overseas expansion. It has
enforcement issues, but the availability of civil damages, possible
injunctive relief, and even criminal punishment, gives American MNEs a
range of options to pursue if their trade secrets are misappropriated. 7 1
China also extends liability to third parties, even if their actions are
tangential to the initial wrongdoer. 72  This increases possible routes to
equitable recovery. As China's economy draws closer to the size of the
U.S. economy, its legal and judicial system will have to mature as well. Of
course, this would be welcome news to any MNE doing business there.
In regards to trade secret protection, India falls behind compared to the
other BRIC countries. This is not simply because the nation does not have
a codified trade secret regime, as one can attempt to protect oneself using
contract and tort law. What makes India a frightening place to export one's
exact best choice).
67. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 10,
1993 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China). But see Unsecured
Economies: Protecting Vital Information, supra note 58, at 13 (explaining that China,
along with Russia, have the worst reputations for pursuing security related incidents).
68. See Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996 (Industrial Property Law), art. 195 XIV,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] (Braz.) (displaying penalties ranging from three
months to a year in prison, or a fine).
69. See, e.g., Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets, supra note 47, at 4
(claiming that because Russia views itself as one of the strategic competitors of the
United States, it has become one of the most aggressive consumers of U.S. economic
information).
70. See, e.g., Baldia, supra note 14 (explaining that the traditional "breach of
confidence" tort is applicable only to the fiduciaries of the company and that breach of
contract can only apply to parties with which the US company is doing business).
71. See Bai and Da, supra note 30, at 361 (listing the possible damage calculations
available in China as either plaintiffs lost profits, defendants realized profits, or
reasonable royalty and explaining that once a plaintiff prevails on a claim, permanent
injunctions are possible).
72. See id. at 364 (noting that criminal liability can be extended to third parties
who either acquired or disclosed the protected information when the third party knew
or should have known that the information was acquired wrongfully).
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trade secrets is the fact that even with contract and tort law, a company can
only protect itself from half of the possible threats.73 Contract law can hold
employees accountable,74 and tort law can punish fiduciaries for breaches
of confidence,75 but consider the anonymous hacker who has no
relationship with the company - India's existing system does not provide a
clear route to recovery against such a person. 76 For these reasons, India is
the riskiest destination when it comes to exporting one's trade secrets.
CONCLUSION
The global economy is here to stay. Business will continue to cross
borders, oceans, and hemispheres. Technology will continue to increase
efficiency, processes, and unfortunately, risks. MNEs must be wary of the
legal systems of countries whose economic growth has outpaced their
institutional sophistication - of which the BRICs are the poster children.
The trade secret regimes in the BRICs are not adequate and severely need
improvement. Until that happens, companies who export their trade secrets
in the interest of tapping into new markets must use the utmost caution if
they wish to keep them safe and retain their economic edge.
73. See Baldia, supra note 14 (warning that tort law only applies to fiduciaries of
the US company and that contract law only applies to those that the company has a
contractual relationship with).
74. See id. (emphasizing the need for strong contractual provisions).
75. See id. (acknowledging that India does recognize the common law tort "breach
of confidence).
76. See Nomani and Rahman, supra note I1, at 345 (detailing that the Indian
courts have upheld protection of trade secrets based on breach of confidence,
contractual obligation, and equity, but not explaining the implications of unknown third
party thefts).
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